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 OPINION 
                      
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
  This is an appeal by the government from two judgments 
of sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania.  Defendant-appellees are Paul 
Haut (P. Haut) and Stephen Haut (S. Haut).  Both were convicted 
of conspiracy to commit malicious destruction of property by 
means of fire (18 U.S.C. § 371).  S. Haut was also convicted of 
mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341).  The district court decreased the 
offense levels of both defendants by 4 points, based on a finding 
of minimal participation.  U.S.S.G., Guidelines Manual, § 3B1.2 
(1995).  The district court further reduced their offense levels 
an additional 6 points by way of a downward departure, based on a 
finding that the government’s witnesses were not credible.  
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0.2 
  We will affirm the district court insofar as it 
decreased the offense levels of both P. Haut and S. Haut pursuant 
                     
     
2At oral argument the government withdrew a third basis for 
appeal that it had earlier asserted in its brief.  That third 
basis was a contention that S. Haut’s sentence should have been 
enhanced two points pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 
  
 
 3 
to section 3B1.2 (minimal participation).  However, finding no 
legal justification in the Sentencing Guidelines for the downward 
departure given to P. Haut and S. Haut pursuant to section 5K2.0 
et seq. (other grounds for departure), we will reverse.   
   
I. 
A.  Factual Background 
  This appeal challenges the sentences received by P. 
Haut and S. Haut for crimes arising out of the illegal burning of 
a bar, the Inner Harbor Lounge.  The arson was accompanied by 
mail fraud (the U.S. Mail was used to process fraudulent fire 
insurance claims related to the arson) and culminated in the 
conviction of four defendants, Henry Henson (Henson), Agatha R. 
Haut (A. Haut), P. Haut, and S. Haut.  The activities of Henson 
and A. Haut, whose sentences were not appealed by the Government, 
are described below to provide background and to place the 
actions of P. Haut and S. Haut in proper perspective. 
  Henson, the Vice President of the Inner Harbor, Inc. 
(owner and operator of the bar), was convicted of malicious 
destruction of property by fire (18 U.S.C. § 844(i)), conspiracy 
to commit malicious destruction of property by means of fire (18 
U.S.C. § 371), and mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341).  Henson was the 
foremost offender in the group and his activities in the illegal 
enterprise were extensive.  He personally set the fire and 
solicited a bar patron to assist him in doing so.  He pondered 
aloud whether to “mak[e] it look like wiring.”  Gov’t. App. at 
16.  He offered to burn a friend’s financially troubled bookstore 
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if the friend would help him burn the Lounge.  Henson took “sick 
leave” from work on the three days surrounding the evening of the 
fire.  He attempted to explain at trial that the reason for his 
absence from work was not his health, but unelaborated “business 
to take care of.”  III App. at 944.  Several witnesses testified 
that of the four defendants, Henson most often brought up the 
subject of destroying the Inner Harbor Lounge.  Finally, Henson 
confided to a friend that he had burned the bar and used an 
accelerant in the process.        
  A. Haut, the President of the Inner Harbor, Inc., was 
convicted of conspiracy to commit malicious destruction of 
property by means of fire (18 U.S.C. § 371) and mail fraud (18 
U.S.C. § 1341).  She is the mother of the three other defendants, 
and fully participated in discussions at the Inner Harbor Lounge 
in which she voiced her desire to burn down the bar.  She 
specifically asked that various items stored in the attic of the 
Lounge be removed before the planned fire, and later placed those 
items in storage at her home.   
  After entering into a one-year agreement listing the 
Lounge for sale with a real estate agent, A. Haut abruptly 
contacted the real estate agent approximately six weeks before 
the fire.  For no apparent reason, she directed the agent to 
cancel the contract and discontinue attempting to sell the 
Lounge.  A. Haut purchased the fire insurance policy covering the 
Inner Harbor less than a month before the fire.  This policy was 
obtained after a period of more than four years in which there 
was no coverage.  She declined the offer of the insurance company 
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to mail her the insurance policy covering the bar, preferring 
instead that it be obtained in person on the very day of the 
fire.  On the basis of the fraudulent scheme of A. Haut, the 
insurance company issued a check in the amount of $100,000.    
  P. Haut and S. Haut are the only defendants with whom 
we are directly concerned in this appeal.  P. Haut was convicted 
of conspiracy to commit malicious destruction of property by 
means of fire (18 U.S.C. § 371) and mail fraud  (18 U.S.C. § 
1341).  At the direction of A. Haut, he removed some items from 
the Lounge prior to the fire and participated in family 
gatherings at which the arson was discussed.  S. Haut was 
convicted of conspiracy to commit malicious destruction of 
property by means of fire (18 U.S.C. § 371).  He also was present 
at the Lounge when the arson was discussed.  The jury found that 
neither brother took an active role in the actual burning or 
benefited financially from its occurrence. 
   
B.  Proceedings in the District Court 
  The district court determined that the appropriate base 
offense level pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines for both P. 
Haut and S. Haut was 20.  U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4(a)(2)(B).3  Both fell 
                     
     
3P. Haut was convicted of mail fraud and conspiracy to 
commit malicious destruction of property by means of fire, 
whereas S. Haut was convicted only of the latter.  For offense 
level computation purposes, P. Haut’s counts were grouped 
together because they involved substantially the same harm.  
Section 3D1.3(a) provides that when counts are grouped, the 
offense level applicable to the group as a whole is that of the 
count carrying the highest offense level.  For this reason, S. 
Haut and P. Haut both had a base offense level of 20, the level 
indicated for conspiracy to commit arson, which is higher than 
that specified for mail fraud.  U.S.S.G. §§ 2F1.1 and 2K1.4. 
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under Criminal History Category I, yielding a sentencing range of 
33 to 41 months for each.  The district court, however, granted 
both P. Haut and S. Haut a reduction of 4 points for minimal 
participation, pursuant to Guidelines section 3B1.2.  In 
addition, the district court granted each a further 6-point 
downward departure by reason of the poor credibility of the 
government’s witnesses, citing as authority Guidelines section 
5K2.0.  The court stated that in granting the latter reduction, 
it acted on its prerogative to adjudge the credibility of 
witnesses “for sentencing purposes.”  P. Haut’s App. at 69.  
    The district court found that four of the witnesses for 
the prosecution were “poor . . . in terms of appearance, 
demeanor, recollection, candor, and lucidity,” and described them 
as reminiscent of “the cast from the movie, Deliverance” 
[Deliverance depicts a coarse, brutal, and degraded group of 
people].  P. Haut’s App. at 68.  The court justified its 6-point 
departures based on its findings that “the clear weight of the 
credible evidence supports the findings and conclusions of the 
Court in this rather unique and bizarre prosecution.”  Id. at 69. 
 In fact, the district judge related that had this matter been a 
bench trial, he would have found the government’s witnesses to 
have been so lacking in credibility that he would have acquitted 
the defendants.  The 4-point reductions for minimal participation 
were based on the court’s determination that the involvement of 
both S. Haut and P. Haut was quite limited relative to Henson’s 
and A. Haut’s substantial and pervasive role in the crimes.  
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  After the court reduced the base offense level of both 
S. Haut and P. Haut by 10 points, their final offense level was 
10.  This resulted in an applicable guideline range of 6 to 12 
months.  The district court imposed a sentence of 6 months home 
detention and 5 years’ probation on each defendant. 
II. 
  The district court had jurisdiction over this criminal 
case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 844(i), 
and 1341.  We exercise jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  When reviewing the sentencing decisions of the 
district courts, we apply an “abuse of discretion” standard for 
departures and other questions involving “the traditional 
exercise of discretion by a sentencing court.”  United States v. 
Koon, -- U.S. --, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 2046-47 (1996).  
[W]hether a factor is a permissible basis for departure under any 
circumstances is a question of law, and the court of 
appeals need not defer to the district court’s 
resolution of the point.  [A]n abuse of discretion 
standard does not mean a mistake of law is beyond 
appellate correction.  A district court by definition 
abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.   
 
Id. at 2047 (citations omitted).  See also United States v. 
Romualdi, 101 F.3d 971, 973 (3d Cir. 1996).  In contrast, “[w]e 
review under a clearly erroneous standard the district court’s 
factual determinations, such as whether a defendant receives a 
reduced or increased offense level based on his role in the 
offense . . . .”  United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1126 
(3d Cir. 1991).   
 
III. 
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  We first turn to the government’s challenge to the 
finding of the district court that S. Haut and P. Haut were 
“minimal participants” warranting 4-point reductions in their 
base offense levels.  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.  The Guidelines offer 
limited insight into the precise meaning of “minimal 
participant.”  Specifically, the Guidelines provide: 
§ 3B1.2  Mitigating Role 
Based on the defendant’s role in the offense, decrease the 
offense level as follows: 
 
(a)  If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal 
activity, decrease by 4 levels. 
 
(b)  If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal 
activity, decrease by 2 levels. 
 
In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.4  Pursuant to section 3B1.2, the district court 
decreased S. Haut’s and P. Haut’s offense levels by 4 points 
each.  We find that the district court did not misconstrue the 
                     
     
4The official commentary to section 3B1.2 of the Guidelines 
explains that: 
1.  Subsection (a) applies to a defendant who plays a minimal 
role in a concerted activity.  It is intended to cover 
defendants who are plainly among the least culpable of 
those involved in the conduct of a group.  Under this 
provision, the defendant’s lack of knowledge or 
understanding of the scope and structure of the 
enterprise and of activities of others is indicative of 
a role as minimal participant.    
 
2.  It is intended that the downward adjustment for a minimal 
participant will be used infrequently.  It would be 
appropriate, for example, for someone who played no 
other role in a very large drug smuggling operation 
than to offload part of a single marihuana shipment, or 
in a case where an individual was recruited as a 
courier for a single smuggling transaction involving a 
small amount of drugs. 
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legal meaning of “minimal participant” under subsection (a).  We 
therefore must sustain the district court’s factual finding that 
S. Haut and P. Haut each merit classification as minimal 
participants unless we determine that the district court was 
clearly erroneous in its fact-finding.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 
3557, 3742(d); United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 933 (3d 
Cir. 1992)(quoting Inigo, 925 F.2d at 658); United States v. 
Gonzales, 927 F.2d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1991). 
  The commentary to section 3B1.2 states that a minimal 
participant is, inter alia, “among the least culpable of those 
involved in the conduct of a group.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 (official 
commentary).  The district court made a factual finding that 
“[d]efendants had no [financial] interest in the Inner Harbor 
[Lounge] and did not benefit in any manner from the fire at the 
inn.”  P. Haut’s App. at 66.  Of the four defendants, S. Haut was 
the only one to be convicted of only one crime, not two or three. 
 With relation to the crime for which he was convicted, 
conspiracy to commit malicious destruction of property by means 
of fire, he was among the least involved members of the 
conspiracy.  There is no indication that S. Haut directly 
assisted in the burning of the Lounge or the removal of property 
prior to the fire.  He apparently had no ownership interest in 
the property or business of the Inner Harbor Lounge, and received 
no monetary benefit from the fire.     
  P. Haut’s classification as a minimal participant also 
withstands scrutiny.  As with S. Haut, the district court made a 
factual finding at sentencing that P. Haut had no real economic 
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interest in the Inner Harbor Lounge or its furnishings, and that 
he did not benefit financially from the fire.  
  The district court concluded that, in comparison with 
A. Haut and Henson, P. Haut and S. Haut were “among the least 
culpable” of the conspirators.  See P. Haut’s App. at 65-66; 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.  In reaching its conclusion, the district court 
correctly “assess[ed] the demeanor of the defendants and all the 
relevant information to ascertain [their] culpability in the 
crime.”  United States v. Hewin, 877 F.2d 3, 5 (5th Cir. 1989).  
The district court did not act improperly in considering economic 
gain and the extent of physical participation as indicia of the 
level of culpability.  See United States v. Peters, 962 F.2d 
1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ocampo, 937 F.2d 
485, 491 (9th Cir. 1991).   
  Admittedly, P. Haut’s involvement in the events 
surrounding the burning of the Lounge seems to have been more 
substantial than that of S. Haut.  Nonetheless, the question 
before us is not whether we would have characterized S. Haut and 
P. Haut in precisely the same manner as the district court did.  
Our concern is whether, given the factual findings made at trial, 
the “minimal participant” designation is clearly erroneous.  We 
are mindful that “[a] simple statement by the district court” 
together with some supporting facts of record concerning a 
defendant’s status as a minimal participant is “typically 
sufficient to settle the question.”  Ocampo, 937 F.2d at 491.   
  As we have noted in earlier cases, “[u]nder the clearly 
erroneous standard, a finding of fact may be reversed on appeal 
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only if it is completely devoid of a credible evidentiary basis 
or bears no rational relationship to the supporting data.”  
American Home Prod. Corp. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370-
71 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 
F.2d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1992).  In Gonzales, we stated that the 
district court’s “characterization [of the defendant] as a minor 
participant may have been generous,” but we appropriately 
affirmed.  Gonzales, 927 F.2d at 145.  Here, too, we suggest that 
the district court may have been “generous,” but find that it was 
generous in a manner consistent with the Guidelines.  Our review 
of the record has presented no reason to reverse the district 
court’s determination that the “minimal participant” 
classification accurately describes S. Haut and P. Haut.   
 
IV. 
A. 
  While the district court’s factual findings that S. 
Haut and P. Haut were minimal participants survives our scrutiny, 
we find that the 6-point downward departures granted by the 
district court are unsupportable and without precedent.  The 
district court stated at sentencing that it disagreed with the 
finding of the jury and was granting capacious departures to 
mitigate the impact of the jury verdict.  See P. Haut’s App. at 
68-69.  This is at odds with both the intent of the Guidelines 
and the division of responsibilities that underpins our jury 
system.   
  In passing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress 
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“sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide 
disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses 
committed by similar offenders.”  U.S.S.G., Ch. 1 Pt. A(3) at 2 
(1995).  The Guidelines were created in part to protect a basic 
precept of the rule of law, that like cases are treated alike.  
At the same time, the approach taken by the Guidelines is not 
simply a mechanistic application of tables to yield prescribed 
sentences for crimes.  The Guidelines allow for numerous 
adjustments to be made to better customize a sentence to the 
individual situation of a defendant.  See U.S.S.G. Chs. 3, 4.  In 
addition, departures from the Guidelines are warranted in some 
circumstances after certain procedures are followed.  See 
U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. K.  The well-established law instructs us that 
a court may not depart unless it  
finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance 
of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
formulating the [G]uidelines that should result in a 
sentence different from that described. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); see also United States v. Johnson, 
931 F.2d 238, 241 (3d Cir.), 1991.   
  Koon has recently shed new light on the proper 
evaluation of departure factors, and we quote it at length here: 
If the special factor is a forbidden factor, the sentencing court 
cannot use it as a basis for departure.  If the special 
factor is an encouraged factor, the court is authorized 
to depart if the applicable Guideline does not already 
take it into account.  If the special factor is a 
discouraged factor, or an encouraged factor already 
taken into account by the applicable Guideline, the 
court should depart only if the factor is present to an 
exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case 
different from the ordinary case where the factor is 
present.  If a factor is unmentioned in the Guidelines, 
the court must, after considering “the structure and 
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theory of both relevant individual guidelines and the 
Guidelines taken as a whole,” decide whether it is 
sufficient to take the case out of the Guideline’s 
heartland.  The court must bear in mind the 
Commission’s expectation that departures based on 
grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines will be “highly 
infrequent.” 
 
Koon, 115 S.Ct. at 2045 (emphasis added)(citations omitted). 
  “Encouraged factors” offer sentencing courts assistance 
by setting out a host of considerations that may take a 
particular case outside the “heartland” of any individual 
guideline, thereby warranting a departure.  See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 
et seq.; U.S. v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 948 (1st Cir. 1993).  
“Discouraged factors” are those circumstances enumerated to be 
“not ordinarily relevant” in determining departures.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1 et seq.; Rivera, 994 F.2d at 948.  A factor is 
discouraged when, despite the Guidelines’ failure to provide for 
sentencing adjustments based on it, its presence or absence is 
insufficient “to transform a ‘heartland’ case into an unusual 
case outside the heartland.”  Rivera, 994 F.2d at 948.  Such 
factors include, inter alia, age, socio-economic status, and 
community ties.  U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.6, 5H1.8. 
  In the instant case, the district court made a 
departure on the grounds that the witnesses for the prosecution 
lacked credibility.  We have found no indication that the 
Sentencing Commission specifically considered making upward or 
downward adjustments when witness testimony supporting criminal 
convictions is of dubious credibility.  No explicit statement of 
the Commission makes this factor either encouraged, discouraged, 
or forbidden.  Of the wide variety of other factors we know to 
  
 
 14 
have been considered in formulating the Guidelines5——including 
the defendant’s level of participation in a crime (hence the 
“minimal participant” reduction)——none resembles that invoked by 
the district court in the instant case.   
   The introduction to the Guidelines manual makes clear 
that: 
The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each 
guideline as carving out a “heartland,” a set of 
typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline 
describes.  When a court finds an atypical case, one to 
which a particular guideline linguistically applies but 
where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the 
court may consider whether a departure is warranted. 
 
U.S.S.G., Ch. 1 Pt. A(4)(b) at 5-6 (emphasis added).  In 
assessing “whether a departure is warranted,” we have been 
instructed by the Supreme Court to evaluate whether the proposed 
ground for a departure is supported by “the structure and theory 
of both relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken 
as a whole.”  Koon, 115 S.Ct. at 2045.  We find that necessarily 
embedded in the heartland of every guideline is the assumption 
that individuals sentenced under it have been found guilty beyond 
                     
     
5See generally Kirk D. Houser, Downward Departures: The 
Lower Envelope of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 31 DUQ. L. 
REV. 361, 364 (1993)(explaining that Congress and the Sentencing 
Commission considered the following factors in formulating the 
Guidelines: grade of the offense; aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances of the crime; the nature and degree of the harm 
caused by the offense; the community view of the gravity of the 
crime; the public concern generated by the offense; the deterrent 
effect that a particular sentence may have on others; the current 
incidence of the offense; defendant’s age, education, vocational 
skills, mitigating or plainly relevant mental and emotional 
conditions, physical condition (including drug abuse), previous 
employment record, family ties and responsibilities, community 
ties; role in the offense, criminal history, and degree of 
dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood.)  See also 
U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.1 et seq., 5K2.0 et seq. 
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a reasonable doubt.  Here, the district court in effect claims 
that “circumstance[s] of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission” places the 
defendants outside the heartland of the guidelines under which 
they were sentenced.  U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 Policy Statement.  The 
alleged “special circumstances” are simply that the defendants 
did not in fact commit the crimes and should not have been found 
guilty.    
  However incredible the district court found the 
witnesses, the jury determined the defendants to be guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  We find the district court’s view, that a 
downward departure is justified when the district court doubts 
the veracity of government witnesses and the guilty verdict they 
support, to be categorically inappropriate.  We are mindful that 
Koon explains that “with few exceptions, departure factors should 
not be ruled out on a categorical basis.”  116 S.Ct. at 2051.  
Nonetheless, the instant case involves one of those few 
exceptions.  The district court's decision to depart was not 
based upon a sound exercise of discretion, as we explain below.  
  When civil cases are decided by bench trial rather than 
by jury, we are careful to give “due regard . . . to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).  By contrast, the federal 
rules of civil and criminal procedure do not contain a 
corresponding rule for cases tried by a jury.  In such cases, it 
is firmly established that it is “the jury’s prerogative to 
decide all questions of credibility.”  United States v. Gambino, 
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926 F.2d 1355, 1367 (3d Cir.), 1991. See also United States v. 
Rockwell, 781 F.2d 985, 990 (3d Cir. 1986)(“the jury, not the 
court, . . . judges the credibility of witnesses”)(quoting 
Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 
412; United States v. Giampa, 758 F.2d 928, 935 (3d Cir. 
1985)(“One of the oldest . . . rules of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence is that the jury is the arbiter of credibility of 
witnesses.”)(quoting United States v. Cravero, 530 F.2d 666, 670 
(5th Cir. 1976)); Sheridan v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 
F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996)(“Evaluation of witness credibility is 
the exclusive function of the jury . . . .”)(quoting Bhaya v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 832 F.2d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 1987).  
  It is a basic tenet of the jury system that it is 
improper for a district court to “substitute[] [its] judgment of 
the facts and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the 
jury.  Such an action effects a denigration of the jury system . 
. . .”  Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir.), 
Finally, as we stated in Giampa: 
The trial judge cannot arrogate to himself this power of the jury 
simply because he finds a witness unbelievable.  See 
United States v. Weinstein, [452 F.2d 704,] 713 [(2d 
Cir. 1971)].  Under our system of jurisprudence a 
properly instructed jury of citizens decides whether 
witnesses are credible.  The trial judge is deemed to 
have no special expertise in determining who speaks the 
truth. 
 
758 F.2d at 935 (3d Cir. 1985)(quoting United States v. Cravero, 
530 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1976)(footnotes and citations 
omitted)).     
 
  The attorney for S. Haut conceded at trial: 
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I realize [my argument that a downward departure is warranted is] 
a stretch.  I don’t know what else I can present to 
this Court that would induce it to downwardly depart.  
I think it’s absolutely ridiculous that [because of the 
Guidelines] I’m placed in the position of having to try 
and construct these somewhat tenuous arguments, but I 
don’t know any way to do it other than that.  I know 
the result that should be achieved, and I’m trying to 
give the Court something to hang its hat on. 
 
P. Haut’s App. at 62 (emphasis added).  As the attorney for the 
Government aptly observed in response to this statement, 
“[Defense counsel’s] proposed arrangement of the Guidelines . . . 
is really an unsupported circumvention of the Guidelines, and 
it’s not supported by the facts or the law or, most importantly, 
justice in this case.”  P. Haut’s App. at 64-65 (emphasis added). 
   The district court acknowledged its obligations in this 
matter: “The jury believed the testimony of the prosecution; and, 
therefore, we find that there is sufficient evidence which, if 
believed, supports the [base offense level of 20 calculated by] 
the probation officer.”  P. Haut’s App. at 65-66.  Nonetheless, 
after conceding its responsibility to honor the jury verdict, the 
district court backed away from doing so.  Cf. Rockwell, 781 F.2d 
at 988 (“Yet in the very next sentence the district court, in 
effect, abrogated its prior directive which had devolved to the 
jury the task of determining all issues of credibility. . . .”). 
 The district court disagreed with the judgment of the jury, as 
reflected in this statement at sentencing: 
We find that the evidence presented by these two witnesses far 
outweighs the evidence for the prosecution; and if the 
case against these Defendants was tried before this 
member of the Court in a bench trial, we would have 
found both Defendants not guilty. 
 
P. Haut’s App. at 68.  After concluding that there was sufficient 
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evidence which, if believed, supported the sentence corresponding 
to offense level 20, the district court sought to substitute its 
own judgment for that of the jury:  
We find that the[] testimony [of two witnesses] was corrupt and 
polluted and must be received with great care and 
caution for sentencing purposes.  We cannot sentence a 
citizen to prison on evidence based on the testimony of 
these two women.  Their bias and interest in the 
outcome of this case is simply too apparent to be 
countenanced, at least for sentencing purposes.   
 
Id. at 69 (emphasis added).  In concluding that the witnesses 
were too “bias[ed] . . . to be countenanced, at least for 
sentencing purposes,” the district court sought to short-circuit 
the jury system and reduce the severity of the jury verdict.  Id. 
(emphasis added).  
B. 
  The district court set forth a theory under which, “for 
sentencing purposes,” it was “empowered to make credibility 
determinations.”  Id.  In an effort to reserve for itself a right 
to assess credibility “in sentencing” when it is dissatisfied 
with the jury verdict, the district court proposed the existence 
of a relevant distinction between credibility assessment at trial 
and at sentencing.  
  To buttress its theory that a trial court is empowered 
to make credibility determinations “for sentencing purposes,” the 
district court cited three opinions of this court, United States 
v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1993), United States v. Gaskill, 
991 F.2d 82, 82-86 (3d Cir. 1993), and United States v. 
Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1992).  These cases are 
inapposite to the instant case.  Of these cases, only Miele 
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directly addresses the question of credibility assesssment. It 
holds that although there are some circumstances in which it is 
appropriate for a court to consider credibility at sentencing, 
those instances have to do not with the question of guilt, but 
with specific matters of degree concerning underlying issues.  
  In Miele, we held that a district court should “receive 
with caution and scrutinize with care drug quantity or other 
precise information provided by [an addict-informant] witness 
before basing a sentencing determination on that information.” 
989 F.2d at 667 (emphasis added).  Miele is distinguishable from 
the present case because it nowhere invites district courts to 
use the questionable reliability of a witness as a basis for 
mitigating the effect of a jury verdict.  Instead, Miele informs 
trial courts that when the severity of the sentence is calibrated 
to a fact that was related to the court by an inherently suspect 
witness, the court can take the credibility of the witness into 
account at sentencing.  For instance, the district court can 
determine that the defendant in fact produced an amount of drugs 
different from that attested to by the witness.  But the district 
court cannot determine, contrary to the finding of the jury, that 
the defendant is not guilty of the crime for which he was 
convicted, or that doubts as to the jury verdict in the judge’s 
mind are sufficient to warrant a diminishment of the sentence.  
Where a jury finds a defendant guilty of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is not the province of the district court to 
interpose its own doubts and thereby distort the effect of a 
guilty verdict.   
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  Miele noted that a section of the Guidelines entitled 
“Resolution of Disputed Factors” explains that “the district 
court may not rest its decision upon facts until it determines 
that the fact or facts have sufficient indicia of reliability to 
support a conclusion that they are probably accurate.”  Id. at 
668 (citing U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3).  This section, however, explicitly 
applies to “factor[s] important to the sentencing determination  
. . . reasonably in dispute.”  U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3.  In the present 
case, the only “disputed” matter germane to the departure was 
whether the defendants actually committed the crimes for which 
they were convicted.  That question, having been resolved beyond 
a reasonable doubt by the jury at trial, was no longer 
“reasonably in dispute” when sentencing occurred.  Id.  
  In Gaskill, the trial court denied a departure to a 
defendant solely responsible for the care of his mentally ill 
wife, finding that it “had no choice” and was not free to grant a 
departure.  991 F.2d at 83-84.  On remand, we informed the 
district court that it “need not shrink from utilizing departures 
when the opportunity presents itself and when circumstances 
require such action to bring a fair and reasonable sentence.”  
Id. at 86.  In that case, the conduct at issue was that of the 
defendant, who possessed extraordinary family circumstances and 
had been extremely attentive to the round-the-clock medical needs 
of his wife.  Such extraordinary circumstances have been 
recognized as legitimate bases for departure.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Higgins, 967 F.2d 841, 845 (3d Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 128-29 (2d Cir. 1992); United 
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States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1331 (8th Cir. 1990).  But see 
United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 529-30 (7th Cir.), 1991 
While Gaskill, 991 F.2d at 86, rightly emphasizes that 
departures, used appropriately, ameliorate the rigidity of the 
Guidelines in important ways, it gives no indication that 
departures are appropriate solely because government witnesses 
impress the district court as incredible.   
  Lieberman held that a “sentencing court may depart 
downward when the circumstances of a case demonstrate a degree of 
acceptance of responsibility that is substantially in excess of 
that ordinarily present.”  971 F.2d at 996.  As with Gaskill, 
Lieberman does not support the district court’s departure because 
it addresses the conduct of the defendant (his post-arrest 
contrition and ameliorative behavior), not the credibility of the 
witnesses.  Lieberman also upheld a second departure granted by  
the district court based on the fact that the Government 
“manipulated his indictment” and failed to group together two 
substantially similar crimes, thereby raising his base offense 
level improperly.  See id. at 998.  While that second departure 
could be described as concerning the conduct of the prosecutor as 
well as the defendant, the ultimate question was the true 
behavior of the defendant: what was the appropriate way to 
characterize the crimes for which the jury found the defendant 
guilty?   
  By contrast, in the instant case the district court 
sought not to effectuate the findings of the jury in the manner 
it believed to be required by law, but to limit the effect of 
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those findings because it disagreed with the jury’s finding of 
guilt.  The effect of the district court’s decision to depart 
based on credibility was to drain the verdict of its proper 
force.  The district court was obligated to sentence the 
defendants within the range established by the Guidelines.   
  Of course, a district court is permitted in appropriate 
cases to enter judgment of acquittal when it finds that the 
circumstances of the case make the jury’s verdict unsupportable. 
 FED. R. CRIM. P. 29; see United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 
120 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 
(3d Cir. 1987),  Cf. EEOC v. Delaware Dept. of Health and Social 
Services, 865 F.2d 1408, 1413 (3d Cir. 1989)(similar standard in 
civil context).  But here, the district court concluded that 
judgment as a matter of law would be inappropriate:  “We close by 
noting that there is sufficient evidence which, if believed, 
supports the verdict of the jury; and, therefore, we are not 
privileged to grant a new trial or enter judgment [of 
acquittal].”  P. Haut’s App. at 69.  The district court 
nonetheless asserted the right to make the type of credibility 
judgments we have shown to be inappropriate:  “However, for 
sentencing purposes, we are empowered to make credibility 
determinations, and in this case the clear weight of the credible 
evidence supports the findings and conclusions of the Court in 
this rather unique and bizarre prosecution.”  Id. 
  At oral argument counsel for S. Haut sought to defend 
this theory that the district court is free to assess the 
credibility of witnesses and to give effect to those assessments 
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through the severity of the sentences imposed.  Counsel 
hypothesized the existence of “a small space” in which a judgment 
as a matter of law is not justified but neither is the sentence 
corresponding to the jury’s verdict, because the poor quality of 
the evidence against the defendant(s) “shock[s the] conscience.” 
 Tape of Oral Argument, October 29, 1996 (on file with the Clerk, 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit).  In that situation, 
counsel suggested, a court is justified in departing downward.  
While this argument is creative, we know of no case in which a 
district court has been allowed to “split the difference” between 
the “not guilty” verdict a bench trial would have yielded and the 
conviction actually handed down by the jury.  To countenance such 
a broad scope of judicial discretion would be to sap the 
integrity of both the Guidelines and the jury system. 
   
V. 
  For the reasons stated, we will affirm the October 20, 
1995, judgment of sentence insofar as it granted both defendants 
a 4-point reduction for minimal participation.  We will reverse 
the judgment insofar as it granted 6-point downward departures to 
both defendants, and remand the case to the district court for 
resentencing consistent with this opinion.   
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